Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China:A Critical Examination by Xie, Lei & Xu, Lu
1 
 
Author post-print, accepted for publication by Transnational Environmental Law 
 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China: A Critical 
Examination 
 




Environmental Public Interest Litigation (EPIL) by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) emerged in China within the last decade amidst the growing focus on 
environmental issues and the increasing political need to bring greater public 
participation to the area. This article examines the current practice of EPIL by NGOs in 
order to understand potential flaws and deficiencies of NGO participation in this 
relatively new field of environmental litigation. The article sets out by exploring EPIL 
as a legal pathway for the public to become involved in China’s environmental 
governance. It then analyzes the legal provision of environmental litigation in China 
before critically examining several instances of EPIL initiated by NGOs between 2015 
and 2019. This article finds that NGOs show weaknesses in their current EPIL practice, 
including in case selection and litigation risk assessment, but are willing to test and 
potentially expand the scope of EPIL into new areas of environmental protection such 
as noise pollution and renewable energy. It concludes that these weaknesses and 
strengths of NGO involvement in EPIL reflect the constantly evolving landscape of 
environmental governance and environmental litigation in China. 
 
Keywords: public participation, public interest litigation, environmental litigation, 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
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(NGOs) 1  emerged in China in the last decade, amidst the growing focus on 
environmental issues and the increasing political need for greater public participation 
in the area. EPIL represents the standard avenue for the public to resolve environmental 
disputes, supervise environmental quality and enforce government policy.2 Through 
this approach, the public is included in environmental governance to address 
environmental problems. By accessing environmental information, often as a precursor 
to environmental litigation, members of the public can defend their individual and 
collective self-interests, and are able to supervise government policy process as well as 
industrial polluters’ performance. Similarly, NGOs often resort to litigation, as a 
strategy to affect government policies and actions in a context where opportunities of 
resistance are otherwise limited.3  
 Since 2015, a number of environmental NGOs have worked to bring dozens of 
EPIL cases each year and these NGOs have become an integral part of the ongoing 
construction of China’s environmental governance. As EPIL appears to have 
empowered NGOs to exercise some supervisory functions on issues concerning public 
interests,4 there have been strong voices, from China and abroad, advocating widening 
 
1 In this context, Chinese law formally uses the term ‘social organization’ instead of ‘non-governmental 
organization (NGO)’. For the sake of its more prevalent usage in English, this article prefers the label 
NGO, except when directly referring to the text or content of Chinese law. 
2 R. Stern, ‘From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China’ (2011) 206 China Quarterly, pp. 294-
312, at 295; S.Y. Tang, C.P. Tang & C. Lo, ‘Public Participation and Environmental Impact Assessment 
in Mainland China and Taiwan: Political Foundations of Environmental Management’ (2005) 41(1) 
Journal of Development Studies, pp. 1-32, at 6-15. 
3 X. Ren & L. Liu, ‘Building Consensus: Support Structure and the Frames of Environmental Legal 
Mobilization in China’ (2019) 29(121) Journal of Contemporary China, pp. 109-24, at 15. 
4 Q. Gao, ‘Public Interest Litigation in China: Panacea or Placebo for Environmental Protection’ (2018) 
16(4) China: An International Journal, pp. 47-75, at 53. 
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access of EPIL to individual citizens.5 From a comparative perspective, environmental 
litigation is an essential norm in environmental legislation, representing increasing 
demand from citizens for decentralized environmental governance.6 There is valuable 
experience in environmental governance to be learned from jurisdictions with more 
established practice, including, for instance, the Unites States, the European Union7 as 
well as India8 and Brazil.9 Such practices represent how citizens, by adopting formal 
means, become empowered to influence environmental policies and improve 
environmental conditions.10 They have also raised hopes that ‘citizen suits’ would play 
a stronger role in China’s environmental governance.11 Nevertheless, it is important to 
examine the effects of environmental litigation by contextualizing the social and 
political conditions of citizens suits. Compared to environmental litigation in developed 
countries that have seen success to a greater or lesser extent, such practices within 
emerging powers still raise questions. While most literature focuses on assessing legal 
institutions that pave way for transparency in policy processes,12 few have focused on 
conditions upon which civil society efficiently serve public interests in environmental 
 
5 T. Zhai & Y.C. Chang, ‘Standing of Environmental Public-Interest Litigants in China: Evolution, 
Obstacles and Solutions’ (2018) 30(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 369-97, at 389. 
6 M. Dumas, ‘Taking the law to court: citizen suits and the legislative process, American Journal of 
Political Science, (2017), 61, 4: 944-957, at 944. 
7 L. Krämer, ‘Public Interest Litigation in Environmental Matters before European Courts’ (1996) 8 (1) 
Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 1-18, at 1.  
8  M. Faure & A. V. Raja, ‘Effectiveness of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in India: 
Determining the Key Variables’ (2010) 21 (2) Fordham Environmental Law Review, pp. 239-94, at 293. 
9 Brinks, D. M. & Gauri, V. (2010). Courting social justice: judicial enforcement of social and 
economic rights in the developing world, New York: Cambridge University Press, at 944.  
10 Faure & Raja, n. 8 above, at 288-291.  
11 林燕梅、成功 Y. Lin & G. Cheng, ‘美国公益诉讼制度下水污染案例分析’ (2011) 6(1) The 
Environmental Rule of Law, pp. 90-103, at 100. <A water pollution case study in the public interest 
litigation system of the USA > (in Chinese) 
12 Dumas, n. 6 above, at 945. 
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litigation practices.13 Take the example of India’s water management. Despite the fact 
that environmental activists have proactively adopted environmental litigation as an 
approach to advocate their causes,14 heated debates have occurred questioning if such 
legal practices have weakened central government’s authority and thus have resulted in 
questionable environmental decisions.15  
Questions can be raised on how free NGOs are to participate in environmental 
enforcement through litigation in China. NGO involvement in legal cases requires them 
to be financially sustainable. However, as NGOs are affected by strict government 
registration and fundraising regulations,16 they are generically ill-prepared to become 
involved in EPIL. Furthermore, NGOs are constrained by the principles and practice of 
the Chinese judicial system, where local courts, explicitly under the leadership of the 
Communist Party, are largely embedded within, and often dependent on, local 
governments.17 When participating in EPIL cases, NGOs have to be very careful about 
the battlegrounds they choose. Some argue that NGOs are supposed to play a supportive 
role in environmental regulation, rather than a confrontational one.18  
 
13 S. Prasai & M. D. Surie, ‘Water and climate data in the Ganges basin: Assessing access to information 
regimes and implications for cooperation on transboundary rivers’ (2015) Water Alternatives 8(2), pp. 
20-35, at 24-29. 
14 Ibid, at 24. 
15 M. Kumar & C. Pandit, ‘India’s water management debate: is the ‘civil society’ making it everlasting?’ 
(2018) International Journal of Water Resources Development, 34(1), pp. 28-41, at 38; C. Pandit, 
Environmental over enthusiasm, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 30(1), pp. 110-
120, at 112-13, 119. 
16 L. Xie, Environmental Activism in China (Routledge, 2009, at 3-19); J. Hsu, C. Hsu & R. Hasmath, 
‘NGO Strategies in an Authoritarian Context, and Their Implications for Citizenship: The Case of the 
People’s Republic of China’ (2017) 28 Voluntas, pp. 1157-79, at 25. 
17 Ren & Liu, n. 3 above, at 5; Stern, n. 2 above, at 307. 
18 Gao, n. 4 above, at 54. 
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Although an increasing body of scholarship has developed which examines the 
features and policy construction of EPIL in China,19 few have questioned NGOs’ own 
practice in the field of EPIL by analysing the details of their behaviour, approach or risk 
perception when participating in lawful environmental enforcement. This article 
assesses the current practice of EPIL by NGOs, and exposes a number of flaws and 
deficiencies in their participation in this relatively new field of environmental litigation.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the government’s intentions 
in promoting public involvement in environmental governance. Section 3 then sets out 
the legal framework of three types of environmental enforcement: EPIL by NGOs; 
EPIL by the procuratorate; and ecological environmental damage compensation (EEDC) 
lawsuits by local governments. Section 4 of this article analyses the data relating to 
EPIL cases available between 2015 and 2018, and goes on to evaluate EPIL by NGOs, 
focusing in particular on its role after the introduction of EPIL by the procuratorate and 
EEDC cases. Section 5 investigates the current practice of EPIL by NGOs through an 
examination of five EPIL cases. This critical examination exposes certain flaws, 
deficiencies and causes for concern or criticism regarding NGOs’ current practices. 
Section 6 concludes by evaluating the current role of EPIL by NGOs and related issues 




19 M. Cao & F. Wang, ‘Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China’ (2011) 19(2) Asia Pacific Law 
Review, pp. 217-35, at 225-27; R. Zhang & B. Mayer, ‘Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China’ 
(2017) 1(2) Chinese Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 202-28, at 211-13. 
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2. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST 
LITIGATION BY NGOs 
China has witnessed dramatic changes in its environmental governance in the past three 
decades. Along with signing the Rio Declaration20 and promoting the principle of 
sustainable development, the Chinese government has promulgated China’s Agenda 
21,21 which recognizes these core principles of the Rio Declaration.22 In addition to 
policy learning through China’s increasing involvement in global environmental 
governance, the Chinese government has initiated policy reforms to promote 
governability with the involvement of multiple actors, enhanced information disclosure 
and transparency.23 Although state agencies remain the most important actors and 
environmental regulation continues to rely strongly on command-and-control, they are 
no longer the sole actors and approaches available. 24  A market-based regulatory 
approach has also been introduced, which introduces economic incentives for market 
actors.25 The public is also increasingly involved in the policy process, as discussed 
 
20 General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development’ (A/CONF. 151/26 Vol. I), 12 Aug. 1992, Annex I. 
21  State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Agenda 21: White paper on China’s 
population, environment and development in the 21st century (1994). An abstract in English is available 
at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12288811/.  
22 郭武 W. Guo, ‘论中国第二代环境法的形成和发展趋势’ (2017) (1) ZUEL Law Journal pp. 85-95, 
at 90 < On the Formation and Development Trend of China’s Second Generation Environmental Law > 
(in Chinese). 
23 G. He, Y. Lu & A. Mol, ‘Changes and Challenges: China’s Environmental Management in Transition’ 
(2012) 23(3) Environmental Development, pp. 25-38, at 33-34.  
24 L. Zhang, P.J. Mol & S. Yang, ‘Environmental Information Disclosure in China: in the Era of 
Informatization and Big Data’ (2017) 12(1) Frontiers of Law in China, pp. 57-75, at 59. 
25 B. Zhang et al., ‘Policy Interactions and Underperforming Emission Trading Markets in China’ (2013) 
47(13) Environmental Science & Technology, pp. 7077-84, at 7077-78. 
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further below. Nevertheless, the government has been slow to implement policy 
reforms and substantive legal change has been slow to materialize. 
 
2.1. Public Participation in China 
The Chinese government has offered various justifications for engaging the public 
through policy change. Generally speaking, to a degree the practices of enhanced public 
participation resemble practices of decentralized governance as a global trend which 
features the involvement of multiple non-state actors. Indeed, the central government 
has shown a preference for promoting public participation for the benefits it may bring 
in better policy implementation. Faced with serious environmental challenges, 
policymakers believe that effective public engagement is beneficial because it may 
facilitate public acceptance of policy decisions. It also allows inputs from experts, 
contributes to improved compliance and supports policy implementation.26  
Chinese authorities also had to react to a growing demand for deliberative 
democracy, which resonates in environmental activism. In the face of environmental 
activism and organized collective action, authorities are careful to try and maintain 
social control and control triggers to social instability. Challenges to China’s political 
authority from environmental activism have developed rapidly. In the first quarter of 
2017 alone, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) received 88,000 
complaints through citizens’ hotline, more than a half of these cases were on air 
 
26 J. Newig & O. Fritsch, ‘Environmental Governance: Participatory, Multi‐Level – and Effective?’ 
(2009) 19(3) Environmental Policy and Governance, pp. 197-214, at 198. 
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pollution and the rest were on pollution of noise, water and solid waste.27 
Additionally, there is a growing public demand for transparency and participation 
in environmental policy making.28 Unhappy about environmental crises such as air and 
water pollution, Chinese citizens, mostly from middle-class and urban backgrounds, 
increasingly voice their dissatisfaction. Such activism takes diverse forms including 
membership of environmental NGOs (both legal and illegal) and participation in social 
movements, court cases, and protests, especially in relation to environmental issues that 
might have an immediate impact on the protesters’ daily life.29 These developments 
have persuaded the government to accommodate public participation, at least to some 
extent,30 to incorporate the public in policy processes.31 The Chinese government sees 
an instrumental use for public engagement, namely,  strengthening party legitimacy 
and enhancing its political control over the regime.32  
 
2.2. China’s Environmental Laws and Public Participation 
The Chinese central government has effected substantive reforms in its environmental 
 
27 ‘Air pollution more than half of environmental complaints in China’, China Daily (4 May 2017), 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-05/04/content_29208110.htm. 
28 A. Wang, ‘Explaining Environmental Information Disclosure in China’ (2018) 44(4) Ecology Law 
Quarterly, pp. 865-924, at 875-77. 
29 Ren & Liu, n. 3 above, at 10. 
30 Wang, n. 28 Above, at 880. 
31  B. He & M. Warren, ‘Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political 
Development’ (2011) 9(2) Perspectives on Politics, pp. 269-89, at 279. 
32 O. Almen, ‘Participatory Innovations Under Authoritarianism: Accountability and Responsiveness in 
Hangzhou’s Social Assessment of Government Performance’ (2018) 27(110) Journal of Contemporary 
China, pp. 165-79, at 167-178, ; B.J. Dickson, et al., ‘Public Goods and Regime Support in Urban China’ 
(2016) 228 China Quarterly, pp. 859-80, at 860; X. Zhu & K. Wu, ‘Public Participation in China’s 
Environmental Lawmaking: in Pursuit of Better Environmental Democracy’ (2017) 29(3) Journal of 
Environmental Law, pp. 389-416, at 416. 
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legal system to encourage public participation in environmental governance.33 Most 
notably, the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (EPL 
hereinafter) underwent a major revision and expansion in 2014.34  It declares that 
individual citizens are ‘entitled’ to environmental information.35 Other documents such 
as the Law of the People's Republic of China on Appraising of Environment Impacts36 
and Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment of Planning37 require the public 
to be engaged in public consultations, while ‘empowering’ citizens to supervise 
environmental quality and ‘enforce’ government policy by accessing such information. 
Some scholars believe that these changes improve the interactions between the 
people and the legislature and facilitate the incorporation of public opinions into law.38 
For instance, even before the 2014 revision of the EPL, NGOs and scientists were 
invited to put forward their views via open discussion in the public sphere regarding 
the proposed amendments to the EPL, marking the first time that state authorities 
openly debated with the public the revision of a national law.39 Further, the revised 
EPL requires that full environmental impact appraisal (EIA hereinafter) reports (instead 
of only a summary, as used to be the practice) must be made available to the public and 
that these reports must include a chapter on how the public participated in the EIA 
 
33 Guo, n. 22 above, p. 93.  
34 Oder of the President of the People’s Republic of China, No. 6, 24 April 2014. 
35 Art. 53 EPL. 
36 First promulgated in 2002 and revised in 2016. This law is the foundation of the Regulation on 
Environmental Impact Assessment of Planning. 
37 Order of the State Council, No. 559, 17 August 2009. 
38 Zhu & Wu, n. 32 above, at 390.  
39 L. Zhang, G. He & A. Mol, ‘China’s New Environmental Protection Law: A Game Changer?’ (2015) 
13 Environmental Development, pp. 1-3, at 2; L. Zhang, et al., ‘Power Politics in the Revision of China’s 
Environmental Protection Law (2013) 22(6) Environmental Politics, pp. 1029-35, at 1032. 
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process.40 This law also requires the government to adopt various forms of engagement 
when incorporating the public in policy making.41 Public consultations have also been 
adopted in budget deliberations,42 whereby participants have a better chance of seeing 
their opinions incorporated in the policy process. 
Some commentators suggest that the decision to grant NGOs access to EPIL is an 
experiment by the central government,43 especially targeted at localities suffering from 
weak enforcement or non-enforcement of environmental regulations.44 Leaders at local 
level may implement environmental policy strategically,45 and local governments may 
favour industries from the same region, including polluters, who contribute to local 
revenue. From this vantage point, the EPIL system challenges local governments’ 
autonomy in environmental governance. Public mistrust may exist at the grassroots 
level if local governments have restricted the activities of environmental NGOs, 
 
40 Art. 56 EPL. 
41 M. L. Tseng, et al., ‘Sustainable Consumption and Production for Asia: Sustainability Through Green 
Design and Practice’ (2013) 40 Journal of Cleaner Production, pp. 1-5, at 3.  
42 X. Yan & X. Ge ‘Participatory Policy Making Under Authoritarianism: The Pathways of Local 
Budgetary Reform in the People’s Republic of China’ (2015) 44(2) Policy and Politics, pp. 215-34, at 
218. 
43  J. Liu, ‘China’s Procuratorate in Environmental Civil Enforcement: Practice, Challenges and 
Implications for China’s Environmental Governance’ (2011) 13 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 
pp. 41-66, at 64; J. Liu, ‘Environmental Justice with Chinese Characteristics: Recent Developments in 
Using Environmental Public Interest Litigation to Strengthen Access to Environmental Justice’ (2015) 
7(2) Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University Law Review, pp. 229-60, at 260. 
44 A. Wang & J. Gao, ‘Environmental Courts and the Development of Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation in China’ (2010) 3 (1) Journal of Court Innovation, pp. 37-50, at 42-44; Ren & Liu, n. 3 above, 
at 6. 
45 X. Li, et al., ‘Authoritarian Environmentalism and Environmental Policy Implementation in China’ 
(2019) 145 Resources, Conservation and Recycling, pp. 86-93, at 87; X. Zhu, et al., ‘Regional 
Restrictions on Environmental Impact Assessment Approval in China: The Legitimacy of Environmental 
Authoritarianism’ (2015) 92 Journal of Cleaner Production, pp. 100-8, at 105. 
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particularly when such NGOs are perceived to pose a threat to the interests of the local 
government. Informal communication arrangements between the government and non-
state actors including NGOs,46 experts and technocrats47 are an alternative means 
whereby the public is involved in policy process. 
 
3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
There are three categories of environmental litigation in Chinese law: civil EPIL by 
NGOs; civil and administrative EPIL by the procuratorate; and EEDC (see Table 1). 
The legal framework for these categories is outlined in the three sections below. There 
are, understandably, some overlaps, collaboration and even conflicts in this new area of 
law. Additionally, but beyond the scope of this article, parties who directly suffered 
from acts of pollution or environmental damage have a right to sue the perpetrators 
under the general law of tort. 
 
 
Table 1 Different Types of Environmental Litigation 
 
 Civil EPIL by 
NGOs 
Civil EPIL by the 
procuratorate 
Administrative 




Plaintiff environmental the procuratorate the procuratorate local 
 
46 K. Shin, ‘Neither Centre Nor Local: Community-Driven Experimentalist Governance in China (2017) 
231 China Quarterly pp. 607-33, at 612. 
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3.1. Civil EPIL by NGOs 
The 2012 amendments to the Civil Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China48 
first introduced the concept of public interest litigation to national law, stating that 
authorities and ‘relevant organizations’ as specified by law can litigate against activities 
that harm the social public interest, such as pollution of the environment. 49  The 
specification of ‘relevant organizations’ for environmental litigation purposes was 
introduced in April 2014 in the aforementioned amendments to the EPL.50 To be 
eligible, a ‘social organization’, or environmental NGO, must be registered with the 
civil affairs authorities at prefecture-level city or above, in accordance with law. 
Additionally, it may only litigate against activities causing environmental pollution or 
ecological damage if it has engaged in public interest activities for environmental 
protection for five years or more continuously without any law breaking.51 In January 
2015, the Supreme People’s Court issued its judicial interpretation, setting out the 
practical and procedural rules for ‘social organizations’ to bring environmental public 
interest litigations.52 
3.2. Civil and Administrative EPIL by the Procuratorate 
In July 2015, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress authorized the 
 
48 Order of the President of the PRC, No. 59, 31 Aug. 2012. 
49 Civil Procedural Law of the PRC, Art. 55. 
50 Oder of the President of the People’s Republic of China, No. 6, 24 Apr. 2014. 
51 Art. 58 EPL. 
52 ‘Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in 




Supreme People’s Procuratorate to start a two-year pilot run of procuratorial public 
interest litigation in 13 province-level regions. The decision was motivated by the need 
‘to strengthen the protection of national interest and social public interest’.53 Both the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s Court then issued 
Implementation Measures for procuratorial public interest litigation in January54 and 
February 2016,55 respectively. These measures set out that the procuratorate of any 
level within the pilot regions could bring either civil public interest litigation or 
administrative public interest litigation. 
Civil public interest litigation concerns activities that harm social public interest in 
areas such as environmental pollution, or food or medicine safety infringements 
affecting a large number of consumers. Administrative public interest litigation 
concerns the illegal exercise of power or inaction by governmental departments that 
harm national interest or social public interest, including in the realm of ecological and 
environmental protection. 
Following the pilot run, the terms of the Implementation Measures were adopted 
after some minor tweaks in the form of amendments to the Civil Procedural Law of the 
PRC and the Administrative Procedural Law of the PRC respectively, in June 2017.56 
The involvement of procuratorates in public interest litigation was a monumental shift 
in policy and practice, as it quickly mobilized the vast resources available to more than 
 
53  Available in Chinese on the National People’s Congress website at:  
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2015-07/01/content_1940395.htm. 
54 Available in Chinese on the Supreme People’s Procuratorate website at: 
https://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/201601/t20160106_110439.shtml. 
55 Available in Chinese on the Supreme People’s Court website at: http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-
xiangqing-37422.html. 
56 Civil Procedural Law of the PRC, Art. 55(2); Administrative Procedural Law of the PRC, Art. 25(4). 
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3,600 procuratorates in China. Prosecutors outside the pilot regions wasted no time in 
taking advantage of this new power, and thousands of public interest litigations have 
been brought forward by the procuratorate (see Figure 1). 
 
 






3.3. Ecological Environmental Damage Compensation Litigation 
The latest entrant into the fray of environmental litigation comes in the form of EEDC. 
In December 2015, the General Office of the Communist Party of China Central 
Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued a pilot reform 




53 68 58 65







2015 and 2017. 57  The system was consolidated and expanded for national 
implementation in December 2017 by a full Reform Plan from the same two General 
Offices, effective from 1 January 2018.58 In June 2019, the Supreme People’s Court 
issued ‘Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trial of Ecological Environment 
Damage Compensation Cases (Trial)’, marking the continuing development of the 
EEDC system. 
EEDC cases can only be brought by provincial or prefectural level government and 
their designated department, but not by county level government.59 After events such 
as sudden major environmental incidents, pollution, or damage to ecology, EEDC 
litigation is only available if the government cannot agree on damages or remedies after 
negotiation with the person or entity causing the damage, or if no negotiation could take 
place.60 
Although the EEDC system has been in place for almost either two to four years in 
various parts of China, it has so far been based on policy documents and judicial 
interpretations, and is yet to be formally enshrined in any law or regulations. The Party 
and the State Council’s pilot plan and full plan made no mention of any specific piece 
of legislation that would give effect to the new system. Given the weight of political 
authority that a joint plan from the Communist Party and the State Council carries, there 
is no reason to doubt that EEDC will become law, sooner or later.61 In any event, the 
 
57  Available in Chinese on the State Council website at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-
12/03/content_5019585.htm. 
58 ‘Reform Plan of the Ecological Environmental Damage Compensation System’, available in Chinese 
on the State Council website at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-12/17/content_5247952.htm. 
59 Reform Plan, ibid, Part 4, Section 3. 
60 Interpretation 2019/No.8 of the Supreme People’s Court, Art. 1. 
61 The Tort Liability Part of the Civil Code, enacted by the National People’s Congress in May 2020 to 
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lack of formal legal basis has not prevented the court from reaching a decision in the 
majority of cases brought forward by local governments.62 
 
4. EXAMINATION OF EPIL CASES BY NGOs 
From 2015 to 2018, between 53 and 68 EPIL cases were initiated by NGOs each year, 
with a slight increase in number overall. Although the procuratorate started almost a 
year later than NGOs in EPIL, the number of procuratorial EPIL cases very quickly 
dwarfed those put forward by NGOs, especially after the pilot run ended and national 
implementation started (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Nevertheless, a closer examination 
of the number indicates that the vast majority of procuratorial EPIL cases are either 
administrative EPIL or civil EPIL attached to criminal prosecution.63 In 2018, out of 
the 1,737 procuratorial EPIL cases, 376 (21.7%) were administrative EPIL, while 1,248 
(71.8%) were civil EPIL attached to criminal prosecution. Only 113 (6.5%) were civil 
EPIL unrelated to criminal proceedings.64 
 
commence on 1 January 2021, contains provisions on the liabilities from environmental pollution and 
ecological damage, but makes no specific reference to EEDC principles or procedures. 
62 Supreme People’s Court website, available at: http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
162292.html. Some cases were explicitly decided on the basis of the aforementioned ‘reform plan’. 
E.g., 山东省环境保护厅 v 山东金诚重油化工有限公司, (2017)鲁 01 民初 1467 号, 济南市中级
人民法院 (21 Dec. 2018); 黄强勇 v 龙海市水利局, (2018)闽 06 民终 1109 号, 漳州市中级人民
法院 (25 May 2018). 
63 A typical scenario for bringing civil EPIL attached to criminal prosecution will be where the 
procuratorate is already prosecuting for crimes of damaging the environment (commonly under 
Criminal Law of the PRC, Art.338) and establishes evidence of the environment damage in terms of its 
scale and the likely costs for remedial work. The criminal prosecution will then proceed to establish the 
criminal liability, while the civil EPIL trialed and decided by the same court in a single process will 
establish the civil liability. 




Administrative EPIL is beyond the remit of NGOs. Although nothing in the law 
stops NGOs from bringing forward any civil EPIL, it is arguably inconvenient or 
inefficient for NGOs to start civil EPIL if the claim could be attached to an ongoing 
criminal proceeding by the procuratorate. In any case, NGOs still brought more than a 
third of the civil EPIL independent of criminal prosecution (65 out of 178, or 36.5%) 
in 2018. A much smaller number of EEDC cases were dealt with by the court around 
the same period, with a cumulative total of 20 by the end of 2018.65 
 
 
Table 2 Number of EPIL cases by the procuratorate and NGOs66 
 
 NGOs The Procuratorate 
2015 53 67 6 68 
2016 68 67 77 69 
2017 58 70 1,304 70 
2018 65 70 1,737 70 
Total 244 3,124 
 
 
Within civil EPIL the procuratorate should play a complementary role to NGOs, at 
 
65 Supreme People’s Court press conference on 2 March 2019, ibid. 
66 There are some relatively minor discrepancies among the statistics from different sources. 
67 李楯 D. Li (ed), 环境公益诉讼观察报告 [Review of Public Interest Litigation in Environment 
Protection 2016] (Law Press China, 2017), at 1. 
68 Ibid, at 311 & 316. 
69 Supreme People’s Court press conference on 7th March 2017, news report available in Chinese at 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2017/03/id/2573898.shtml. Li, n. 67 above, at 311-325 would 
indicate that the number could be as high as 140. 
70 Supreme People’s Court press conference on 2nd March 2019, n. 65 above. 
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least in theory. According to the Civil Procedural Law of the PRC, the procuratorate 
may bring public interest litigation only if no suitable governmental department or 
NGO could litigate, or if such department or organization would not litigate.71 In 
practice, the procuratorate is much more active through the use of a pre-litigation 
procedure, which serves to identify and encourage qualifying NGOs to come forward 
and bring civil EPIL.72 Moreover, the procuratorate can offer further assistance in civil 
EPIL brought by NGOs, such as helping with the collection of evidence or sending out 
prosecutors at the court hearing in support of the NGOs.73 The latest report from the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate in October 2019 calculated that assistance was 
provided in 87 EPIL cases by NGOs,74 which would account for more than a quarter 
of all such cases.75 
Intriguingly, the enthusiasm of NGOs to bring EPIL seems to be significantly and 
positively influenced by the presence of procuratorial involvement. Under the pilot run 
in 2016, procuratorates in only 13 out of 31 provincial-level regions in Mainland China 
(excluding the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau) could initiate 
EPIL. NGOs had no such restriction and could bring EPIL anywhere since January 
2015. Nevertheless, of the 68 EPIL cases brought by NGOs in 2016, only 18 came from 
 
71 Civil Procedural Law of the PRC, Art. 55(2). 
72 张锋 F. Zhang, ‘检察环境公益诉讼之诉前程序研究’ [‘Research into the Pre-trial Procedure of 
Prosecutorial Environmental Public Interest Litigation’] (2018/11) Political Science and Law 151. 
73 E.g. 中华环保联合会 v 朱宏根, (2018)苏 05 民初 1192 号, 苏州市中级人民法院 (26 Dec. 
2019). 
74 张军 J. Zhang, ‘最高人民检察院关于开展公益诉讼检察工作情况的报告’ <‘Report by the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate on undertaking procuratorial work for public interest litigation’> (23 
Oct. 2019), available at https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/tt/201910/t20191024_435925.shtml. 
75 The latest available number count is 298 cases by the end of June 2019. Supreme People’s Court press 




outside the pilot run regions.76 In other words, 73.5% of the EPIL cases by NGOs were 
concentrated in 41.9% of the regions where the procuratorates could already bring EPIL. 
While each of the 13 provincial-level regions included in the pilot run had at least one 
EPIL case by NGOs in 2016, 10 out of the 18 regions outside the pilot run did not see 
a single case, including both highly developed regions such as the municipals of 
Shanghai and Tianjin as well as large, less prosperous inland provinces such as Sichuan 
and Jiangxi. 
This unusual concentration of cases where NGOs choose to get involved could be 
explained partly by the small number of qualified and interested NGOs. Although more 
than one thousand registered ‘social organizations’ are potentially able to bring EPIL, 
fewer than twenty of these come forward each year.77 Unsurprisingly, regionally based 
environmental NGOs tend to launch EPIL with a clear regional focus. If more 
regionally based NGOs are involved in places where the procuratorate are under the 
pilot run, EPIL is more likely to materialize therein. 
However, a large number of EPIL cases are in fact brought by nationally based 
environmental NGOs, most noticeably the China Biodiversity Conservation and Green 
Development Foundation (CBCGDF), Friends of Nature (FON), and the All-China 
Environment Federation. Although these organizations are registered within one region, 
which happens to be Beijing for all three, they operate nationally and initiate EPIL well 
 
76葛枫 F. Ge et al, ‘2016 年度环境公益诉讼观察报告’ <‘Observation report on environmental public 
interest litigation in the year of 2016’> in Li, n. 67 above, at 337. 
77 Ibid at 335; 黄娜、杜家明 N. Huang & J. Du, ‘社会组织参与环境公益诉讼的优化路径’ (2018) 
36 (9) Hebei Law Science 191, at 193 <Optimized Path for Social Organization Participating in 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation> (in Chinese). 
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outside their place of registration. Interestingly, even these organizations prefer to 
litigate in certain regions and not others, especially in view of the fact that, before June 
2017, many of the regions disfavoured by NGOs had no help from the procuratorate. 
The existence of such apparent regional preference will be revisited in the case 
analysis.78 
Meanwhile, although EEDC cases remain relatively few in number, their emergence 
would push EPIL by NGOs into an uncomfortable and further weakened position. EPIL 
by NGOs takes precedence over EPIL by the procuratorate, as the latter should only 
proceed if no NGO is in place to litigate.79 Since June 2019, however, EEDC cases by 
local governments trump EPIL by NGOs, as the court must suspend the EPIL trial until 
after the completion of the EEDC trial. EPIL can only cover issues not already dealt 
with in the EEDC case.80 
Similar to other rules and practice surrounding the EEDC structure currently under 
development, this priority rule currently is not affirmed in any law or regulation. 
Nevertheless, this status shift for NGOs, from being the preferred litigant in EPIL to the 
deferred party after the EEDC case, is a potentially crucial development. In effect, a 
local government can now supersede any ongoing EPIL by initiating EEDC 
proceedings, causing much delay and uncertainty for the NGO in the original EPIL. It 
is possible that the maturing of the EEDC system will further complicate the tasks for 
NGOs contemplating EPIL as they now have to negotiate between the judicial and 
 
78 Section 5.3, below. 
79 Civil Procedural Law of the PRC, Art. 55 (2). 
80 Interpretation 2019/No.8 of the Supreme People’s Court, Art. 17. 
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administrative powers even more carefully than a few years ago. Such an imminent 
challenge is not easy for NGOs to deal with, especially at the current stage of the 
development of EPIL which, as we argue in the next section, already displays some 
notable deficiencies and flaws affecting EPIL by NGOs. 
 
5. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF EPIL PRACTICE BY NGOs 
 
5.1. The Objectives and Choices of EPIL by NGOs 
Although EPIL and EEDC are new labels which have emerged in the past few years, 
governmental or administrative involvement in major environmental incidents is 
certainly neither novel nor unusual. However, NGOs have struggled at times to 
coordinate their involvement, including in litigation, in the fast-evolving developments 
following major environmental crises. First and foremost, NGOs have often chosen to 
litigate regarding incidents in which the administrative powers have taken effective 
control of the situation, including the implementation of remedial work and the 
imposition of financial sanctions on the wrongdoers. In these cases, NGOs arriving later 
at the scene often struggle to establish either new evidence about what had happened or 
new demand to what the administrative powers have already imposed. This in turn 
obscures the objectives of pursuing such EPIL and raises the question as to the choice 
made by these NGOs. 
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The Tengger Desert case 
In September 2014, media reports emerged about serious water and soil contamination 
of parts of the Tengger Desert in Inner Mongolia and Ningxia.81 For years, various 
industrial operations had been disposing of hazardous elements into the environment 
without due processing, in a blatant breach of domestic law and regulation. The overt 
accumulation of serious pollution was vividly depicted in graphic material and video 
reporting by the national media, leading to a public outcry at a time when environmental 
concern was high on the list of national concern. Authorities ranging from the State 
Council to the MEE took swift actions in the following months and most of the clean-
up and restoration work was successfully implemented by September 2015.82 
Meanwhile, CBCGDF lodged an EPIL in the local court in August 2015. The 
lawsuit was rejected by the Zhongwei Intermediate People’s Court and CBCGDF’s 
appeal against this rejection was again dismissed by the High People’s Court of Ningxia 
Autonomous Region.83 The main reason given by both courts in rejecting CBCGDF’s 
lawsuit was that the CBCGDF charter did not specifically provide that ‘protection of 
the environment’ was part of its operation,84 which disqualified the organization from 
 
81 CCTV News, 6 Sept. 2014, available at 
http://m.news.cntv.cn/2014/09/06/ARTI1410011258266870.shtml. 
82 By December 2014, the State Council established a dedicated ‘supervision and investigation group’ 
to oversee the handling of the incident and the clean-up efforts to follow. The then Ministry of 
Environmental Protection undertook most of the work, imposed various sanctions on the perpetrator 
companies within its administrative powers, and put in place plans for restoration of the environment by 
February 2015. With most of the clean-up and restoration work successfully implemented by September 
2015, the Ministry of Environmental Protection removed the ‘special supervision status’ it imposed on 
the restoration project in November 2015. 
83 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 宁夏瑞泰科技股份有限公司, (2015)卫民公立字第
6 号, 宁夏回族自治区中卫市中级人民法院 (19 Aug. 2015); (2015)宁民公立终字第 6 号, 宁夏回
族自治区高级人民法院 (6 Nov. 2015). 




CBCGDF applied to the Supreme People’s Court for a retrial in January 2016. The 
retrial was granted and then completed in a matter of one week, with the final judgment 
of the Supreme People’s Court in favour of CBCGDF, directing the local court to accept 
the EPIL. The Supreme People’s Court pointed to various stated objectives in the 
charter of CBCGDF, ranging from ‘supporting biodiversity and green development’ to 
‘promoting the establishment of an ecological civilization and the harmony between 
human kind and nature’, and concluded that the scope and aim of CBCGDF did 
encapsulate ‘protection of the environment’, despite the absence of explicit phrases to 
that effect.86 The retrial judgment was later selected to be a ‘guiding case’ by the 
Supreme People’s Court, further endorsing its authority and merit.87 
Zhongwei Intermediate People’s Court promptly accepted the EPIL launched by 
CBCGDF in early 2016 against the eight defendant companies responsible for serious 
pollution of the Tengger Desert. Yet, this development was overtaken by the events 
unfolding outside the court system, as the pollution incident had largely been dealt with 
by the administrative authorities several months earlier. As later court documents would 
show, the defendants were held financially liable for a total sum of 569 million renminbi 
(RMB 569 million) in various fines and expenses for remedial work and environmental 
 
Application of Law in the Conduct of Environmental Civil Public Interest Litigations, Art. 4. 
85 Art. 55 EPL. 
86 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 宁夏瑞泰科技股份有限公司, (2016)最高法民再 47
号, 最高人民法院 (28 Jan. 2016). 
87 Guiding Case No.75, English translation by Stanford Law School China Guiding Cases Project 
available at http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-75/. ‘Guiding cases’ are selected by 
the Supreme People’s Court to serve as a guidance, if not binding authorities, for future decisions by all 
courts. For a more detailed explanation of this system, see e.g. Lu Xu, ‘The Changing Perspectives of 
Chinese Law’ (2019) 5 The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 153, 162. 
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restoration.88 By 2016, the remedial and restoration work either had been implemented 
or was in the process of being implemented under governmental supervision. Despite 
CBCGDF getting a judicial endorsement from the Supreme People’s Court to go ahead 
with the lawsuit, it was unclear what this particular EPIL could achieve. 
After more than a year, CBCGDF settled with each of the eight defendant 
companies. CBCGDF was said to be ‘satisfied’ by the proof provided by the companies 
that work had been done or was being done to remedy the environmental damage. Each 
company ‘voluntarily’ contributed a sum to be used for ‘repairing the service function 
of the local environment’, totalling around RMB 6 million.89 CBCGDF also recovered 
RMB 1.28 million in costs from the settlement. 
It is appropriate that companies or individuals who wilfully and recklessly pollute 
the environment in the pursuit of higher profit margins are hit with significant financial 
and other sanctions, both for remedying the damages they have caused and as a 
deterrent for future entities contemplating such behaviours.90 The perpetrators of the 
Tengger Desert pollution were made to pay RMB 569 million, and a number of their 
managers and executives received prison sentences in separate criminal proceedings. 
 
88 Respective liabilities range from RMB 1.97 million to 219 million for each defendant. 中国生物多
样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 宁夏中卫市大龙化工有限公司, (2016)宁 05 民初 16 号, 宁夏回族
自治区中卫市中级人民法院 (28 July 2017); 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 宁夏中卫
市美利源水利有限公司, (2016)宁 05 民初 12 号, 宁夏回族自治区中卫市中级人民法院 (28 July 
2017). 
89 The contribution varied from RMB 100,000 to 1.43 million for each company. 中国生物多样性保
护与绿色发展基金会 v 宁夏中卫市大龙化工有限公司, (2016)宁 05 民初 16 号, 宁夏回族自治区
中卫市中级人民法院 (28 July 2017); 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 宁夏明盛染化
有限公司, (2016)宁 05 民初 18 号, 宁夏回族自治区中卫市中级人民法院 (28 July 2017). 
90 徐以祥 Y. Xu, ‘论我国环境法律的体系化’ (2019), 41(93) Modern Law Sciences, pp. 83-95, at 90-
92 < ‘On the Systematization of Chinese Environmental Laws’ > (in Chinese). 
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There was no indication that the RMB 569 million was inadequate to punish the 
perpetrators and restore the environment, as far as money and modern science would 
allow. By the time CBCGDF attempted to initiate EPIL, and certainly by the time it got 
the green light from the Supreme People’s Court in 2016, the administrative process to 
deal with this major incident was in full motion and producing outcomes. It is unclear 
what was to be gained by the EPIL despite the eventual RMB 6 million settlement, as 
there was no sign that this sum of ‘voluntary contribution’ accounted for anything that 
the original sum of RMB 569 million failed to cover. 
The Hyundai Motors case91 
There are other examples of EPIL being pursued with unclear objectives. Hyundai 
Motors was found to be selling a specific type of vehicle between March 2013 and 
January 2014 that failed to meet Beijing emissions standards due to defective fuel 
injectors. Hyundai promptly moved to remedy the defect in these vehicles and by June 
2014 its remedial actions were approved by the authorities. In September 2014, the 
Beijing Bureau of Environmental Protection imposed administrative sanctions in 
accordance with law and regulation and confiscates ‘unlawful income’ to the sum of 
RMB 13.5 million. It also imposed a 10% penalty of RMB 1.35 million.92 
Yet in May 2016, more than 18 months later, FON decided to initiate EPIL over 
the incident, demanding that Hyundai be ordered to stop selling the vehicles concerned 
 
91 Announcement by Beijing No.4 Intermediate People’s Court (27 May 2019), available at 
http://bj4zy.chinacourt.gov.cn/article/detail/2019/05/id/3965982.shtml. 




and pay an unspecified sum of compensation ‘as to be determined by experts’ for the 
damage to the atmosphere by the polluting cars. Hyundai responded that it had not sold 
any cars in violation of the regulation for more than two years, and that the claim was 
therefore groundless. After almost three years, the parties settled in May 2019, with 
Hyundai voluntarily contributing RMB 1.2 million for ‘protecting and repairing the 
atmosphere, preventing air pollution and supporting environmental public interest 
activities’, in addition to RMB 200,000 to FON to cover costs incurred in the litigation. 
Similar to the settlement in the Tengger Desert cases above, there was no indication 
that the original sanction of almost RMB 15 million imposed by the government was 
inadequate, or that the EPIL by FON established any new facts unknown in 2014. With 
no knowledge of Hyundai’s decision making process, it may nevertheless be speculated 
that RMB 1.4 million of voluntary contribution, mostly in the name of protecting the 
environment, was a modest price to pay for a multinational carmaker to terminate a 
longstanding dispute with a major environmental NGO. For FON, on the other hand, 
RMB 200,000 could cover much of its litigation costs, so that the EPIL potentially did 
not result in a significant financial loss. 
It is notable that, in both the Tengger Desert and the Hyundai Motor cases, the 
NGO concerned chose to take action after a high-profile incident or against a high-
profile defendant, even where administrative authorities had seized clear and effective 
control of the situation many months before the EPIL. The litigation did not uncover 
any additional liability or legal responsibility that had been overlooked in the 
consideration of administrative measures and sanctions. It is therefore hardly 
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unexpected that no court judgment against any of the defendants was forthcoming and 
the cases resulted in settlement after several years with some voluntary contribution 
and reimbursement of costs by the defendants. 
In most cases, administrative measures in the wake of major environmental 
incidents do, and should, take effect much quicker than any court judgment. If the 
objective of NGOs was to oversee policy implementation, EPIL by NGOs should 
arguably focus on identifying what the ‘fire-fighting’ administrative measures have not 
covered or have missed, instead of focusing on what has already been addressed under 
the scrutiny of national media. 
 
5.2. Litigation Costs and Risk-Perception of NGOs in EPIL 
On several occasions, the decisions by NGOs as to which EPIL to pursue and how to 
approach litigation reveal a potentially skewed perception of the costs and risks of EPIL, 
as illustrated in the cases below. 
The ‘Poisonous Land’ of Changzhou 
In September 2015, a secondary school in Changzhou, Jiangsu Province, moved to its 
newly built campus. In the following months, many pupils started displaying symptoms 
such as nausea, skin irritation, hair loss and so on. The ensuing investigation identified 
the cause as soil pollution of a plot of land about 200 metres away from the campus. 
Although the land was not in use at that time, it had been the site of several chemical 
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and pesticide factories between the late 1960s and the early 2000s. The incident was 
reported on national television in April 2016 as ‘the poisonous land of Changzhou’ and 
caused wide-ranging concern among the public.93 
FON and CBCGDF, two major environmental protection organizations, joined 
forces to bring forward EPIL in May 2016. They identified three defendant companies 
as responsible for the pollution and demanded compensation for damage to the 
environment, a public apology, and the reimbursement of costs incurred by the NGOs. 
The case was, however, complicated by several factors. The three companies, one 
of which is a large state-owned enterprise of Changzhou, had moved away from the 
relevant site many years before the exposure and the lawsuit. More importantly, in 2008 
the plot of land had already been recovered by the local government for redevelopment, 
which included ongoing efforts to remedy the known historic pollution. Although at the 
time of their activities the companies acted in a way which would be considered 
blatantly harmful to the environment by modern standards, it was less straightforward 
to establish the illegality of some of those activities retrospectively. 
Consequently, FON and CBCGDF lost at first instance. The court acknowledged 
the obvious public interest in bringing the lawsuit, but found that the defendants were 
not in a position to implement any remedial steps, given that they no longer had control 
of the land. The claim also failed to establish the exact responsibilities of the defendants, 
given the highly complicated history of privatization of state-owned enterprises and 
 
93 The Paper, 18 Apr. 2016, available at https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1457900. 
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various corporate restructurings over many years.94 
The decision caused shockwaves, not only because this was a high-profile loss for 
two major NGOs, but also because of how the court fees were calculated. On the basis 
of the monetary claim of RMB 377.3 million as compensation for environmental 
damage, the court applied its standard fees of about 0.5% and arrived at a figure of 
RMB 1.89 million in court fees. If FON and CBCGDF had to shoulder the sum between 
them, this would have been a heavy financial burden for even large and nationally 
established NGOs to bear. 
Fortunately for FON and CBCGDF, their appeal was partially upheld by the High 
People’s Court of Jiangsu Province. The court held that the difficulty in proportioning 
liabilities to each defendant could be overcome if the court exercised its judgement on 
what was reasonable. Although not everything the defendant companies did in the past 
was necessarily illegal at the time, they were held responsible for the continuing 
harmful contamination of the land and ordered to apologize to the public. 
However, for several years after the companies ceased their operations, the land 
had been retained by the local government, which was already making efforts to remedy 
any remaining problems. The fact that land pollution was a historical issue made it 
difficult for the court to decide on present financial liabilities. The court rejected FON 
and CBCGDF’s suggestion to award compensation as some recognition of the costs of 
the remedial work undertaken by the local government over the land, because the local 
 
94 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 江苏常隆化工有限公司, (2016)苏 04 民初 214 号, 江苏
省常州市中级人民法院 (25 Jan. 2017).  
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government was not a party to the EPIL. There was no feasible way to calculate, or 
even to estimate, the appropriate monetary compensation for any lasting damage to the 
environment after ongoing restoration efforts by the local government. 
On the controversial issue of court fees, the appeal court held that since there was 
no basis for assessing monetary compensation, the case should be treated as a non-
monetary lawsuit, with the court fees at first instance and on appeal of RMB 100 each 
borne by the three defendant companies.95 In essence, the NGOs won on principle and 
did not have to pay the RMB 1.89 million court fees; the companies lost and had to 
apologize, but did not have to pay hundreds of millions in compensation. Following 
this final decision, FON decided to drop the case. CBCGDF applied to the Supreme 
People’s Court for a retrial.96 
While the Supreme People’s Court will re-examine the case, the first-instance 
imposition of RMB 1.89 million in court fees was a timely reminder to NGOs of the 
risks of litigation. Given the growing sentiment for environmental protection in the 
society in general, there is arguably the unspoken assumption, held by both the public 
and those involved, that EPIL is a rightful action brought in the public interest by well-
intentioned NGOs against irresponsible perpetrators who harm the environment. The 
losing party pays the court fees, so it would be the polluters who pay. They should also 
pay for the reasonable costs incurred by the claimants, including attorney fees and other 
expenditures.97 Against this background, it is largely understandable that lawyers in 
 
95 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 江苏常隆化工有限公司, (2017)苏民终 232 号, 江苏省
高级人民法院 (26 Dec. 2018). 
96 CBCGDF website (25 Jan. 2019), available at: http://www.cbcgdf.org/NewsShow/4857/7421.html. 
97 Interpretation 2015/No.1 of the Supreme People’s Court, Art.22. 
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court proceedings would ask for sensational figures of hundreds of millions of RMB. 
Since cases such as the ‘poisonous land of Changzhou’ reminded claimants of the 
prospect of losing a case at the cost of very substantial court fees, many calls have been 
made for the fees to be set at a low, flat rate, such as RMB 50 per case, independent of 
the monetary value of the case.98 The main argument for such special treatment is the 
public-interest nature of EPIL as well as the fact that NGOs are not litigating for their 
own financial gains. 
Some of the claims by NGOs, especially in relation to their attorneys’ fees and 
litigation costs, do not naturally support the argument for treating EPIL as special, non-
monetary litigation. As things stand, the rules heavily favour NGOs in EPIL, with the 
court having the option to ask the defendants to bear reasonable costs of NGOs, while 
there is no corresponding possibility for the defendants’ costs to fall on NGOs even if 
the claim fails. Moreover, the court can allow deferment, discount or even waive the 
court fees payable by NGOs.99 Even so, there have been multiple instances of NGOs 
claiming much higher costs and attorneys’ fees than the court is prepared to award. 
In the ‘poisonous land of Changzhou’ case, FON and CBCGDF claimed costs of 
RMB 1.45 million between them. The court was clearly unimpressed by the scale of 
these claims and awarded RMB 230,000 to each, or less than a third. However, in the 
application to the Supreme People’s Court for a retrial, CBCGDF again claims not only 
the full costs, but also asks the court fees to be restored to RMB1.89 million each at 
 
98 肖建国、宋史超 J. Xiao & S. Song, ‘程序视角下的环境民事公益诉讼若干问题’ <‘Several issues 
of civil environmental public interest litigation from a procedural perspective’ > in Li, n.67 above, 355-
362, at 362. 
99 Interpretation 2015/No.1 of the Supreme People’s Court, Art. 33. 
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first instance and on appeal, to be borne by the defendant companies, instead of 
RMB100 each as set by the High People’s Court.100 It seems a remarkable display of 
confidence for any litigant to ask the court to increase the court fees by almost 20,000 
times of what the court has been prepared to charge, and it suggests that any implicit 
message from the appellate court expressing its discontent at the high costs being 
claimed has been lost. 
The ‘poisonous land of Changzhou’ saga is not an isolated example of the court’s 
discomfort with the costs claimed by NGOs in EPIL. In a case about waste disposal 
from Shandong Province, CBCGDF claimed RMB 300,000 in attorneys’ fees plus 
further ‘contingency fees’ dependent on the outcome of the litigation. Jinan 
Intermediate People’s Court presumably did not like the notion of some litigation bonus 
and awarded RMB 100,000.101 Sometimes the court is stricter or more forthright about 
the level of fees. The smallest amount of attorneys’ fees awarded could be as little as 
4% of what a victorious NGO claimed.102 In an appeal on waste-water discharge from 
Zhejiang Province, the High People’s Court gave a succinct but stern lecture on how 
the attorneys’ fees should be ‘only what is reasonable’. CBCGDF had claimed RMB 
688,700 in attorneys’ fees but the court took issue with the notion that this figure was 
purely based on what the attorneys claimed to be entitled to, with no other verification 
 
100 The Beijing News, 25 Jan. 2019, available at 
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2019/01/25/542977.html. 
101 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 山东金诚重油化工有限公司, (2016)鲁 01 民初 780
号, 济南市中级人民法院 (27 Dec. 2018). 
102 湘潭生态环境保护协会 v 湘潭市金鑫矿业有限公司, (2018)湘 03 民初 196 号, 湖南省湘潭市
中级人民法院 (30 Sept. 2019). The court awarded RMB 10,000 in attorneys’ fees out of RMB 236,300 
claimed (4.2%), despite finding the defendant liable for RMB 654 million in damage to the environment. 
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of the actual number of hours worked or the amount of work undertaken. The final 
award was set at RMB 200,000. 
Notably, the appeal in the latter case was an outright loss for CBCGDF as the court 
dismissed it on all grounds. Nevertheless, the court discretionarily split the court fees 
of RMB 195,995 equally between CBCGDF and the defendant company, while 
granting a discretionary discount of CBCGDF’s share only of the court fees from RMB 
97,997.5 to 1,000.103 
The court’s willingness to waive 99% of the court fees it could legitimately charge 
an NGO which has just lost its appeal, is indicative of the generally supportive attitude 
of the judiciary vis-a-vis NGOs in EPIL. In some cases, the NGOs arguably 
demonstrate a callous attitude towards the risks and costs inherent in litigation, at least 
until the court decides against them. It is not impossible for NGOs to lose outright in 
EPIL, for example by failing to establish that the activities under scrutiny were harmful 
to the environment, despite committing substantive sums towards forensic analysis.104 
In September 2017, an environmental NGO based in Chongqing made national 
news headlines by bringing EPIL against three major online food delivery platforms 
simultaneously, alleging that they failed to provide environmentally friendly 
alternatives to disposable cutlery. Without waiting for court proceedings to commence, 
this NGO also revealed to the media that it was preparing next to sue both McDonald’s 
 
103 中国生物多样性保护与绿色发展基金会 v 浙江富邦集团有限公司, (2018)浙民终 1015 号, 浙
江省高级人民法院 (25 Apr. 2019). 
104 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 北京都市芳园房地产开发有限公司. (2015)四中民初字
第 233 号, 北京市第四中级人民法院 (24 Oct. 2018). 
35 
 
and KFC at the same time.105 The news report contained no information or discussion 
as to how a local environmental NGO would be preparing the resources to take on five 
of the biggest names in the food industry at the same time and the financial 
consequences if the litigation did not go well. 
It is argued that any strategy to go after the big, headline-making incidents or global 
commercial names, perhaps in the expectation that the court will simply grant all costs 
in a win or at least mitigate all fees in a loss, is not convincing as a robust long-term 
plan for the development of EPIL. At the same time, the suggestion to charge only 
nominal court fees does not sit comfortably with the practice of some NGOs to claim 
costs and attorneys’ fees at a level which multiple courts have found exorbitant. 
 
5.3.Questionable Practices by Major NGOs in EPIL 
Some of the practices by major NGOs engaged in EPIL would go beyond questions of 
institutional choice and arguably impact upon the foundation of justice. The following 
two cases raise concerns that major environmental NGOs may have brought the 
impartiality and neutrality of the judicial system into question, and obstructed 
adherence to strict jurisdictional boundaries within the legal system. 
The forensic public interest fund 
In December 2016, the China Environmental Protection Foundation (CEPF) brought 
 




forward an EPIL against a steel processing company in Tangshan, Hebei Province, 
regarding air pollution. This case was remarkable for being the first time that an EPIL 
made use of funding from a newly established ‘China Environmental Protection Fund’, 
which awarded RMB 100,000 to the case for the cost of forensic analysis relating to the 
environmental damage caused by the defendant company. According to the terms of the 
fund, any Chinese court can apply to it for a sum of money between RMB 60,000 and 
120,000 to carry out necessary investigation in any civil EPIL.106 However, this fund 
was established by none other than CEPF, the claimant in this particular EPIL. The 
judges in this case had to actually fill an application form to apply to CEPF for money, 
in order to facilitate forensic studies in the litigation, before eventually directing a 
settlement between the parties in March 2019. 
The rationale for this new fund, as explained on its website, speaks about the 
difficulties for ‘the majority of courts’ in securing financial support to carry out their 
investigative duties in EPIL, which the fund seeks to address.107 Noble as the intention 
may be, the current operation of the fund would mean that, in cases such as this, the 
court received money, not to mention having actively applied for it, from one of the 
litigant parties to carry out its judicial investigations, before reaching a hopefully just 
and unbiased decision. This would patently affront some of the basic tenets of natural 
justice and the rule of law, not least that the judge should remain neutral and impartial, 
or that justice must be seen to be done. It was inexplicable and arguably unacceptable 
that CEPF did not excuse itself from even considering the application for money in 
 




relation to litigation that it was actively participating in. The awkwardness of this course 
of events apparently eluded many, as the news of this settlement was covered by the 
national newspaper for the judiciary as a good example of judicial innovation.108 Such 
a mode of funding practice where an NGO acts both as the funding source to support 
the work of the judiciary and an active litigant in the same EPIL, without taking any 
note of the obvious conflict of interest, is in clear need of fundamental rethinking. 
The Shandong Lorry Cases 
NGOs seem to display some regional preferences when considering EPIL. In some 
cases, however, this arguably has gone much further to the extent of attempting to 
actively manipulate the jurisdiction of the court. 
In February 2018, FON brought two similar EPIL cases in Beijing No.4 
Intermediate People’s Court against two lorry manufacturers based in Shandong 
Province, in relation to vehicle emissions beyond the legal threshold and the 
consequential air pollution.109 The lorries concerned were manufactured in Shandong 
and had never been sold in Beijing. FON preferred the case to be trialled in Beijing 
instead of Shandong and chose to sue a joint defendant in each case, both being retailers 
based in Beijing who signed retail agreement with the manufacturers. It offered no 
explanation of its forum choice or litigation strategy. Notably, the retail agreement 
 
108  People’s Court Daily, 25 June 2019, available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2019-
06/25/content_156898.htm. 
109 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 北京环宇宝龙汽车销售服务有限责任公司, (2018)京 04
民初 48 号, 北京市第四中级人民法院 (16 Aug. 2018); 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 北
京中顺天达贸易有限公司, (2018)京 04 民初 49 号, 北京市第四中级人民法院 (16 Aug. 2018). 
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between the manufacturers and retailers only came into effect several months after the 
manufacturers had stopped making and selling the lorries which were found in violation 
of emission regulations. The court found that the Beijing-based defendants had no 
connection with the offending lorries, and nor were these lorries ever sold in Beijing by 
any retailer as they never obtained the necessary permission for sale in the capital. 
Alongside some incisive remarks about the potential harm of jurisdiction 
manipulation by claimants, the court explicitly concluded that ‘the defendant is only 
added to this litigation by FON for the purpose of altering the jurisdictional court’. Both 
lawsuits were promptly dismissed and FON was directed to bring them forward in 
Shandong instead. 
FON’s strategy of seeking to alter the jurisdictional court is unexplained and highly 
questionable. If it felt that the Beijing court would be more favourable to its claims, 
such a move would arguably run counter to the policy motives for EPIL, such as 
promoting transparency in environmental governance.110  Without any evidence or 
argument to the contrary from FON, it would seem that Shandong, and not Beijing, 
would have been most impacted by any environmental damage caused by the lorries 
concerned. It was arguably inappropriate for a national, environmental NGO such as 
FON to attempt to manipulate the jurisdiction of the court in such a manner. 
The Shandong case further illustrates the false sense of security displayed by some 
NGOs in bringing forward EPIL claims. For any law-abiding, environmentally-
conscious company, the prospect of being drawn into EPIL by a major NGO must be 
 
110 Wang, n. 28 above, p. 901. 
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both daunting and frustrating. As things stand, judicial interpretation explicitly forbids 
counterclaims by a defendant in EPIL against the claimant NGO.111 Furthermore, in 
suing businesses, NGOs are possibly motivated by the ‘indirect’ effects of EPIL, which 
are to raise environmental awareness among the public and pressure polluting 
companies to comply with environmental regulations.112 Nevertheless, given the likely 
consequences of EPIL such as reputational damage, it is possible that defendants, 
especially those dragged into ill-conceived EPIL such as the two Beijing-based retailers 
found by the court to be completely unrelated to the defective lorries in question, may 
seek formal redress against claimant NGOs in future, for example through separate tort 
lawsuits. 
 
5.4. New Directions in EPIL by NGOs 
Notwithstanding some of the more questionable practices presented above, there are 
some genuinely exciting efforts by NGOs in bringing forward EPIL cases which have 
the potential to better define the scope and content of environmental protection. At the 
time of writing, several EPIL cases are going through legal proceedings, which have 
the potential to answer difficult questions such as whether governmental bodies could 
become liable in EPIL if they cause environmental damage, or whether state-owned 
monopoly utility companies could be liable in EPIL in the absence of a breach of 
 
111 Interpretation 2015/No.1 of the Supreme People’s Court, Art. 17. 
112  J. Peel, & H. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy, 




In September 2018, CBCGDF brought forward EPIL against the Wildlife Rescue 
Centre of Guangxi Autonomous Region and its superior, the Forestry Authority of 
Guangxi, in relation to the death of armadillos. These armadillos were smuggled into 
China back in 2017, when they were discovered by law enforcement and handed over 
to the Wildlife Rescue Centre for quarantine. CBCGDF alleged that, after quarantine 
was completed, the Wildlife Rescue Centre failed to follow the proper procedure of not 
releasing eight animals found to be ‘healthy but weak’, which eventually led to their 
death. 113  The case covers multiple issues of great interest, ranging from the 
applicability of public interest standards to specific tasks of animal quarantine, to the 
responsibility of governmental departments and their ancillary institutions. The case 
may well shed light on the previously raised question114 of whether civil EPIL can be 
brought against a governmental department or its subsidiary. 
Moreover, in June 2019, CBCGDF brought an EPIL claim against a number of 
defendant companies in Wuhan, Hubei Province in relation to the death of 36 adult and 
6,000 juvenile Chinese sturgeons, a critically endangered species. CBCGDF alleged 
that the defendant companies carried out construction of a bridge and roadworks 
without proper environmental assessment and that the constant noise from the 
construction work eventually caused the death of the fish.115 This is likely to be the 
first time that noise becomes the focus of EPIL as a new addition to the usual suspects 
 
113 The Beijing News, 7 May 2019, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2019-
05/07/c_1124459053.htm  
114 Zhai & Chang, n. 5 above, at 384. 
115 CBCGDF website, 14 June 2019, available at http://www.cbcgdf.org/NewsShow/4857/8920.html  
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of air, soil and water pollution. 
Beyond wildlife protection, some EPIL by NGOs ventures into uncertain territories 
in terms of the scope of environmental protection. After several years of efforts and two 
court hearings, FON’s EPIL on wind energy, against the state-owned monopoly 
electricity network company of Gansu Province, was accepted by the court.116 The 
defendant company produces no electricity itself and only contracts with various 
producers of wind, solar and fossil energy. The essence of the claim is that the defendant 
company chooses to restrict and cut back on the full capacity of wind energy from time 
to time due to constraints on energy capacity and the operation of its electricity 
infrastructure. This results in wind energy not being harvested to the maximum as 
required of an electricity network company by law,117 which in turn leads to fossil 
energy being used in substitution. Such activities are allegedly cause environmental 
damage, which could have been averted had the capacity of the electricity supply 
network been greater to accommodate those periodic excesses in wind energy. 
It is notable that the defendant company does not directly cause environmental 
damage as it is not engaged in the actual production of electricity. With myriad political, 
legal, economic and technological moot points to navigate, it may well be several years 
before the dust settles on this ongoing lawsuit. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see 
NGOs willing to test the boundaries and make efforts to expand beyond the EPIL 
comfort zone. 
 
116 北京市朝阳区自然之友环境研究所 v 国网甘肃省电力公司, (2018)甘民终 679 号, 甘肃省高
级人民法院 (28 Dec. 2018). 




6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
EPIL represents the commitment of the Chinese central government to address 
environmental issues and the harm caused by environmental incidents, as well as the 
political drive to move important, especially monetary, decisions in the fallout of 
environmental incidents away from the government as policy makers and towards the 
courts as just arbitrators. The findings in this article indicate that EPIL by NGOs is now 
a reasonably established part of the legal enforcement mechanism in environmental 
protection.  
Meanwhile, the role of EPIL by NGOs among competing mechanisms in the 
Chinese legal system is evolving. Although EPIL has empowered NGOs to exercise 
some supervisory functions on public interest issues, NGOs are restricted in their choice 
of pathways to participate in environmental governance. Our findings indicate that 
although state powers such as the court and the procuratorate have been supportive 
overall in substantive ways, the contribution of EPIL by NGOs is nevertheless under 
pressure from competing mechanisms in the form of EPIL by the procuratorate and 
EEDC litigation. In particular, EEDC has the potential to undermine the justification 
for EPIL by NGOs as local governments are arguably in a better position to represent 
the public interest in the case of environmental damage to a local area. EEDC has also 
been prioritized over EPIL in recent court rulings. Such inherent competition exists 
despite the overall support that the court, the procuratorate and the government have 
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shown towards NGOs in bringing forward EPIL.  
Furthermore, the involvement of Chinese NGOs in EPIL reveals some of the 
challenges of incorporating the public in environmental governance. Our findings 
indicate that, when practising EPIL, some NGOs seem almost oblivious to the inherent 
costs and risks of litigation. This may be explained by Chinese NGOs’ organizational 
development and financial status. Apart from restrictive registration policies,118 NGOs 
are faced with pressure to mobilize funding to secure financial stability.119 Compared 
to their counterparts in Western liberal democratic societies, where some NGOs have 
become specialists in environmental litigation, Chinese NGOs have comparatively less 
legal knowledge and expertise.120 Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that these 
NGOs would need to consider a different funding and sustainability model for EPIL, as 
they are likely to incur significant costs, even in successful lawsuits. 
Similarly, as EPIL has only been established in the last decade, very few NGOs 
have gained a high level of knowledge and expertise with respect to China’s 
environmental governance.121 Accordingly, NGOs’ legal approaches represent mixed 
practices, which show a tendency to focus litigation efforts on sensational, major 
incidents that received national media and public attention. Often litigation is pursued 
by NGOs despite prompt and significant administrative measures having already been 
taken to address the problem, while their perception of the costs and risks involved in 
 
118 J. Ashley & P. He, ‘Opening one eye and closing the other: the legal and regulatory environment for 
“grassroots” NGOs in China today’ (2008) International Journal of Civil Society Law, pp. 26- 96, at 41. 
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litigation would appear questionable across different cases. It is submitted that the 
problems and concerns identified in relation to the EPIL practice of NGOs would need 
to be fully examined in any discussion of potentially expanding the scope of EPIL under 
Chinese law. Hence, China’s experiences in environmental litigation differs from those 
found in liberal democracies, reminding us particularly of the challenges in adopting 
the legal approach to protect the environment in the context of Chinese culture and 
politics.122 
NGOs are evidently learning and experimenting in new areas, such as wildlife 
protection and energy production, by implementing EPIL as the most effective tool to 
formally engage with stakeholders such as governmental departments or major state-
owned enterprises. Alongside developing a more balanced view of the opportunities 
and risks of EPIL, it can certainly be hoped that NGOs will take full advantage of the 
EPIL mechanism as an alternative approach to the more dominant procuratorial EPIL 
and the emerging EEDC lawsuit. With a better understanding of the system of EPIL, 
more reasoned decision-making and more efficient use of its resources, NGOs can 
certainly play an important role in China’s evolving environmental governance. 
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